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This study investigated the ways and manners in which the affairs of banking sector in 
Nigeria are managed by those charged with the responsibility. It showed the 
relationship between corporate governance and the performance of banks in Nigeria. 
The population of the study consisted of all the twenty four consolidated banks in 
Nigeria that met the requirement of ^25billion capital base as at today. A sample of 
five of them was considered adequate for generalization. One hundred and thirty 
questionnaires were administered on the management staff of those selected banks out 
of which 120 were returned and10 were not properly filled. Statistical Package for 
Social Scientist (SPSS) was used to analyze the data collected and interpretation of 
data was done through simple percentages. Pearson Product Moment Correlation was 
used to test the relationship that exists between efficient Corporate Governance in the 
banking sector and the roles of external auditor and the composition of the board of 
directors.  The study revealed that, lack of proper corporate governance is the bane of 
so many banks in Nigeria. The collapse and failure of many banks was as a result of 
both poor audit control and directors’ negligence to observe due diligence and 
acceptable standard practices. However, banking sector has greatly contributed to the 
gross domestic product of Nigeria and consequently improved the economy. 
Therefore, transparency, honesty and objectivity have to be encapsulated in the 
running of banking operations so as to have a positive effect on the continuity of the 
organization. 
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Introduction  
There has been a recent revival of concern about the issue of corporate governance, which is 
as a result of the rampart demise of large corporations all over the world. This makes it look as if there 
was no cohesion in the way corporate organizations are being governed. Various corporations have 
collapsed e.g Enron Corporation in the USA, Polly Peck in US, Maxwell Communication and Bank of 
Credit and Commerce Industry (BCCI), National Bank of Nigeria, Societe Generale Bank etc. The 
event at Enron and other cases of spectacular failure have helped to bring to the limelight the 
important role that the strengthening of governance mechanisms could play to improve firm 
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performance. Bank failures in Nigeria dated back several decades and the consequence has been 
terrible until lately when the Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC) and Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN) stepped up vigilance and loan recovery (Sanusi, 2009).   Orogun (2009) painted a very 
interesting picture of the principles governing banking as a developing tool. Quoting the former 
Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa, Adeniji (2004) said ‘our banking system 
must be totally committed to the creation of favorable socio-economic environment for real productive 
investment and not for speculation’. Therefore there seems to be a link between the mode of 
governance and the performance of corporations, which means that the way a corporation is directed, 
controlled and structured has some effects on the result the organization achieves in terms of its 
performance (Denis and McConnell 2003). Corporate governance in Nigerian organizations is not 
only an evolving concept, but is also tied in with the notion of corporations and their practices within 
the wider society. Clark and Thomas (2000) defined corporate governance as a set of processes, 
customs, polices, laws and institutions affecting the way in which a corporation is directed, 
administered or controlled. Corporate governance also includes the relationship among the many 
players involved (the shareholders and stakeholders) and the goals for which the corporation is 
governed. The principal players are the shareholders, management, and the board of directors, the 
accountants and auditors. Other stakeholders include employees, suppliers, customers, lenders, 
regulators and the community at large. 
Kala, (2005) asserted that corporate governance could also be said to be the consistent 
management, cohesive policies, processes and decision-rights for a given area of responsibility in a 
separate legal entity that is different from its owners, invisible, artificial and existing only in the 
contemplation of the law.      
Parker (2002) considered corporate governance as the processes of activities involved in 
running an enterprise through the influence of the board of directors and top executive members of the 
enterprise. Paker noted that there is a direct and clear causal link between the actions of the board of 
directors and the success of the organizations measured in terms of such factors as profitability, 
reputation and share price. He asserted that this link to business performance is rarely strong ranging 
from satisfactory to weak. Corporate governance therefore refers to the way by which the board of 
directors sets the framework of action. 
Parker (2002) noted that this involves the board of directors in eight key activities which include: 
1) focusing on the core activities and being pragmatic 
2) adding values and reducing cost 
3) building a business culture that embraces change 
4) moving with the market but not changing faster than the market 
5) leading the market 
6) integrating e-business activities, aligning and optimizing resources  
7) managing risk and 
8) Establishing and maintaining good corporate governance. 
 
The above listed activities represent some of the issues involved in corporate governance and 
can be termed the ‘art of corporate governance’ which ensures organizational effectiveness, 
performance or success in a health and conflict free corporate environment. 
 
Statement of the Problem 
There seems to be some elements of doubt if the governance of corporate organizations is 
really effective considering the rate of bankruptcy and demise of large corporations all over the world, 
both in Nigeria and foreign countries (Inam 2006). In recent times, the world has witnessed the failure 
of large corporations; in particular, the Nigerian banking sector is currently experiencing insider 
abuses of reckless granting of credit facilities running into several billions of naira without adequate 
security. This is contrary to accepted practice which has been attributed to large scale fraud by 
directors in connivance with auditors. Also identified by (Mehra 2005) is the problem of window 
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dressing (eye-service) by the directors who are aided by the auditors, as well as the issue of negligence 
and misfeasance on the part of the auditors when auditing the financial statement of organizations 
which can be attributed to the lack of independence of the auditors. One will wonder at what was 
really wrong when a bank which has been declaring huge amount of profits and has been declaring 
dividends to shareholders is suddenly declared bankrupt (Mehra 2005). With this as the background, 
this study seeks to examine the nature of corporate governance in practice in the Nigerian banking 
system to see if those people charged with the responsibility of managing the affairs of the enterprise 
are religiously following the acceptable practices of corporate governance as stipulated by the 
regulatory authorities in Nigeria and that of other developed countries of the world.  
 
Research Objectives 
i) To assess the significance of Auditor’s independence and its role in corporate governance. 
ii) To assess the relationship between corporate governance and the composition of the board of 
directors. 
iii) to examine the organizational structure of the bank and its management. 
 
Research Hypotheses 
The following Hypotheses shall be empirically tested through the adoption of Product 
Moment Correlation; 
 
Hypothesis 1:  There is no significance relationship between auditor’s independence and the  
effective corporate governance. 
Hypothesis 2: There is no significance relationship between corporate governance and the  
composition of the board of directors. 
 
Literature Review 
Corporate governance refers to the processes, structures and information used for directing 
and overseeing the management of an institution (Duncan and Cameron, 2005). A good corporate 
governance framework establishes the mechanism for achieving accountability between the board, 
senior management and shareholders, while protecting the interests of relevant stakeholders and they 
also set structure through which the division of power in the organization is determined (Duncan and 
Cameron, 2005).  Donaldson and Davis (2003) averred that corporate governance is a system by 
which corporate entity is directed. It relates to the functioning of the board of the company and the 
conduct of the business internally and externally. Theoretically, the control of a company is divided 
into two namely: the board of directors and the shareholders through the annual general meeting. 
Unlike in small private companies, in a public company, the board tends to exercise more of a 
supervisory role, and individual responsibility and management tends to be delegated downward to 
individual professional executive directors (such as a finance director or a marketing director) who 
deal with  particular areas of the company’s affairs (McNamara, 2009). Governance is considered as 
that organ of small or big organizations or even the large society, which is charged with the 
responsibility of controlling resources of all types, within the spheres of its influences, and also having 
power to rule over the human and material resources, of the organization or community (Ogundele, 
2005). The governing of a business organization is vested in the headship of such enterprise usually 
the board of directors that formulate policies, to guide the behaviour of the members of the 
organization and relevant associates of the organization. The objective of corporate governance is to 
achieve corporate excellence and enhance shareholders’ value, while not neglecting the need to 
balance the interests of all stakeholders (Chukwudire, 2005). Tricker, (1994) associated corporate 
governance with managing the organization in the interest of the shareholders. This implies the agency 
in the context of the separation of ownership and management in corporations. Dress and Lumpkin 
(2002) noted that modern corporation has the feature of the separation of ownership and management. 
There is a separation between those that own the corporation and those that manage, control, and 
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direct it. It is from those who own the corporation that the boards of directors are elected during the 
annual general meeting.   Duncan and Cameron, (2005) asserted that shareholders at the company’s 
Annual General Meeting legally appoint the directors. Hence, the directors individually and the board 
collectively should be responsible and answerable to the shareholders for their activities and practice. 
Furthermore, the directors should be willing to act as stewards of the corporation’s assets and 
consequently work to maintain and enhance the value. 
Frank and Graeme, (2005) asserted that corporate governance is seen as a set  of processes, 
rules to be complied with, rather than the desired outcome of directors, that is the authority exercised 
with probity and unquestionable  integrity over the corporations’ affair. This means that the 
corporation has nurtured an opportunity for management to act more in its own interest rather than the 
shareholders’ interest and this is the genesis of Modern Corporation in the Companies’ Act of 1844. It 
was not accidental that the 1844 Companies Act required annual accounts and reports which must be 
audited which will better protect the interest of shareholders. Effective stewardship relies on justice, 
trust of the owners in, and in the probity of the stewards (Frank and Graeme, 2005). However, when 
the managers are not the owners, agency problems drag firm performance in as much as the managers 
as the decision makers are not the residual claimants of wealth and as such, these managers may have 
a tendency to act for their own interests (Fama 1980).  
 
Code of Corporate Governance 
According to Frank and Graeme (2005) the followings are considered essential for effective 
operations of corporate governance in any public limited liability company; 
1) Half-yearly financial statement prepared by the management of the entity and subject to a 
limited scope review (not audited) by the external auditors. Such a review should be 
conducted and reported in accordance with International Standard on Auditing (ISA) 910. 
Auditors are also required to issue an engagement letter. 
2) It is the responsibility of an auditor not to engage in an entity whose shares he holds, or his 
blood relatives hold. Hence, such auditor must disclose the interest to the company within 14 
days of his appointment and divested within 90 days if he wishes to be engaged.  
3) Auditor should not hold office unless they have been given a satisfactory rating under the 
quality control review programme of International Federation of Accounting Committee’s 
(IFAC’s) guidelines on code of ethics. 
4) No auditor should hold an office for more than five (5) years. Where this becomes 
impracticable then, the partner in-charge of audit engagement must be rotated. 
5) Auditor should furnish management with a letter to the board of directors of the entity not 
latter than 30 days from the date of audit report. 
6)  Auditor should attend the Annual General Meeting at which the audited accounts shall be laid 
before the shareholders for considerations. 
7) Auditor should not accept non-audit assignments from the company such as management 
consultancy, designing of accounting systems, compilation of accounts, share registrar 
services etc. 
8) Auditor should review and certify the statement of compliance with best practice of corporate 
governance prepared by the management of the company before publication to the extent 
where such compliance can be objectively verified (wikipedia). 
 
The above listed codes have been issued to serve as standards and guidelines for part of the 
governance of an organization that deals with certifying the truthfulness and fairness of financial 
statements (Kala 2005). They serve as the judge who either justifies or condemn the board of directors 
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Pillars of Corporate Governance 
In all ramifications of human endeavor, the foundation of corporate governance is the attitude 
and practice of the society. Inam (2006) postulated that these values are based on the following: 
1) Accountability of power, based on the fundamental beliefs that power should be exercised to 
promote human well-being. 
2) Democratic values, which relate to the sharing of power, representation and participation; 
3) The sense of right and wrong; 
4) Efficient and effective use of resources; 
5) Protection of human rights and freedoms, and maintenance of law and order and security of 
lives and property; 
6) Recognition of the government as the only entity that can use force to maintain public 
orderliness and national security; and  
7) Attitude towards the generation and accumulation of wealth by handwork. 
 
Models of Corporate Governance 
There are two major models examined in this study and they are; 
 
Anglo–American Model 
Corporate governance around the world differs according to the variety of capitalism in which 
they are embedded. The liberal model that is common in Anglo-American countries tends to give 
priority to the shareholders’ interest. It has also been embraced because it appears to be based on laws, 
rules and regulations. The coordinated model that one finds in Continental Europe and Japan also 
recognizes the interests of workers, managers, suppliers, customers, and the community. Each model 
has its own advantage and distinctive competitive disadvantage. The liberal model of corporate 
governance encourages radical innovation and cost competition, whereas the coordinated model of 
corporate governance facilitates incremental innovation and quality competition. However, there are 
important differences between the United State recent approach to governance issues and what has 
happened in the United Kingdom. 
In the United States, a corporation is governed by a board of directors, which has the power to 
choose an executive officer, usually known as the chief executive officer.  The Chief Executive 
Officer has broad powers to manage the corporation on a daily basis, but needs to get board approval 
for certain major actions, such as hiring his /her immediate subordinates, raising money, acquiring 
another company, major capital expansions, or other expensive projects. Other duties of the board may 
include policy setting, decision making, monitoring management’s performance, or corporate control. 
The board of directors is normally selected by and responsible to the shareholders, but the byelaws of 
many companies make it difficult for all but the largest shareholders to have any influence over the 
make up of the board; normally, individual shareholders are not offered a choice of board nominees 
among which to choose, but are merely asked to rubberstamp the nominees of the sitting board. 
Perverse incentives have pervaded many corporate boards in developed world, with board members 
beholden to the chief executive whose actions they are intended to oversee. Frequently, members of 
the boards of directors are CEOs of other corporations, which some see as a conflict of interest. 
The United Kingdom has pioneered a flexible model of regulation of corporate governance, 
known as the ‘comply or explain’ code of governance. This principle is based on code that lists out 
recommended practices, such as the separation of CEOs contracts, the introduction of a minimum 
number of non-executive directors, the independent directors, the designation, and audit and 
nomination committees. All the publicly listed companies in the United Kingdom have to either apply 
those principles or, explain in a designated part of their annual reports why they have decided not to 
apply those principles. The monitoring of those explanations is left in the hands of shareholders 
themselves. The tenet of the code is that one size does not fit all in matters of corporate governance 
and that instead of a statutory regime like that of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the United State. The best 
is to leave some flexibility to companies so that they can make choices most suited to their 
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circumstances. If they have good reasons to deviate from the sound rules, they should be able to 
convincingly explain to their shareholders.    
 
 Non Anglo-American Model 
  In most of the East Asian countries, family-owned businesses dominate. A study by Claessens, 
Djankov and Lang (2000) showed that the top 15 families in East Asia were found to be dominated by 
listed corporate assets. In countries like Pakistan, Indonesia and the Philippines, the top 15 families 
controlled over 50% of public corporations through a system of family cross-holdings, thus 
dominating the capital markets. Family owned companies also dominate the Latin model of corporate 
governance, that is, companies in Mexico, Italy, Spain, France (to a certain extent), Brazil, Argentina, 
and other countries in South America. The state also has a significant input in corporate governance in 
a number of East Asian economies. In some economies, it dominates corporate governance 
completely. Aside from Vietnam and other socialist states that most likely have higher state control 
levels, China has a high level of state dominance with over 80% of listed companies with state control. 
Singapore also has a relatively high level of about 50% and Malaysia also has relatively high level. 
Accordingly, some renowned countries in East Asia have a relatively high degree of state ownership 
and control. 
 
Corporate Governance in Nigeria  
Corporate Governance has become an acceptable international practice, which every country 
is embracing. Realizing the need to align with international best practices the Security and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) in collaboration with Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) inaugurated a 
seventeen (17) member committee in June 2000, in Nigeria, which was headed by Peterside Atedo.  
The committee was mandated to identify weaknesses in the current corporate governance practices in 
Nigeria. Membership of the committee was carefully selected to cut across all sectors of the economy 
including members of professional organizations, organized private sector and regulatory agencies.  
The committee submitted a draft code of corporate governance which centered on Codes of Best 
Practice on Corporate Governance in Nigeria (ICAN, 2006).   
 
Board of Directors’ Composition 
The composition of the board as recommended by Companies and Allied Matters Act 1990 is 
as follows; 
- A mixture of executive and non- executive directors headed by the chairman not to exceed 15 
or less than 5. 
- The board must not be dominated by an individual 
- The position of chairman and chief executive officer should be separated to avoid undue 
concentration of power. In exceptional circumstance where the position is combined there 
should be a strong non –executive independent director as vice chairman.  
- The member should be upright, knowledgeable and have integrity. 
- Executive director remuneration should be set by remuneration committee made up of non-
executive directors. 
 
 Directors Responsibility 
The followings are the general responsibility of directors according to Companies and Allied 
Matters Act 1990;  
- To ensure that the affairs of the company are conducted in a lawful and efficient manner to 
enhance value creation. 
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- Strategic planning  
- Selection, performance appraisal and compensation of senior executive. 
- Succession plans 
- Communication with shareholders 
- Ensure the integrity of financial controls and report 
- Ensuring that ethical standards are maintained and that the company complies with the laws of 
Nigeria. 
 
Shareholders Rights and Privilege 
To ensure good corporate governance the following rights and privileges are made available to 
the shareholders of Public Limited Liability Company in Nigeria (Companies and Allied Matters Act 
1990); 
- The shareholders statutory rights and general rights are protected all the time. 
- The decisions made by shareholders at the general meeting must be well implemented 
- The shareholders are given equal treatment while any holder of 20% and above is given a seat 
on the board. The board must use the general meeting to communicate with the shareholders 
and encourage participation. 
- The shareholders are to elect the directors and approving the terms and their conditions of 
directorship. 
- The venue of the meeting must be carefully chosen so as to make it possible and affordable for 
the majority of the shareholders to attend. 
- The company should not discourage shareholders activities either by institutional shareholders 
or by organized shareholders group. 
- Information made available to institutional shareholders should also be made available to 
other shareholders. 
 
Determinants of Banking Performance 
Loon (2005) asserted that governance framework should reflect the home country’s prevailing 
institutional arrangements and social economic climate with realities. Effective governance requires a 
more fundamental approach in which directors and other executives are enabled to develop their own 
personal governance systems and superimpose it on the corporate governance structure (Kala, 2005). 
The issues of governance deals with who really controls the activities of the company, for whose 
benefit is control exercised, and how are the demands for accountability of board met? The 
stewardship model views director and managers as responsible stewards who should be relied upon to 
run the firm unfettered in the interests of all stakeholders (Hawley and Williams, 1996). 
In a Global Investors’ Opinion Survey of over 200 institutional investors first undertaken in 
2000, Mckinsey found that 80% of the respondents would pay a premium for well-governed 
companies. They defined a well-governed  company as one that has mostly outside directors, who had 
no management ties, undertook formal evaluation of its directors,  and was responsive to investors’ 
requests for information on governance issues. Other studies have linked broad perceptions of the 
quality of company to superior share price performance. In a study of five years cumulative returns of 
Fortune Magazine’s Survey of most admired firms’, Antunovich found that those most admired had an 
average return of 125%, whilst the least admired firms returned 80%. In a separate study Business 
Week enlisted institutional investors and experts to assist in differentiating between boards with good 
and bad governance and found that companies with the highest rankings had the highest financial 
returns. On the other hand, research into the relationship between specific corporate governance 
controls and firm performance has been mixed and often weak. 
In a study carried out by Ahmadu, Aminu, Mikailu, and Garba (2005) attempted to address the 
question of the efficacy of corporate governance mechanism as a means of increasing firm financial 
performance, using pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis for a sample of  93 
quoted companies on the Nigerian Stock  Exchange for the period 1996 -1999. While making a case 
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for a board size of ten and for concentrated as opposed to diffused equity ownership, the results argue 
for the separation of posts of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chairman. Moreover, although the 
results find no evidence to support  the idea that boards with a higher proportion of outside directors 
perform better than other firms, there is evidence that firms run by expatriate CEOs tend to achieve 
higher level of performance than those run by indigenous Chief Executive Officers.   
Empirical studies like those of Lasfer (2002) and Pass (2004) showed that the size of the firm 
tends to affect the extent to which board independence may influence corporate performance. 
According to them, in small firms, it is more likely for board independence to have significant effect 
on performance. Large firms tend to be more complex and the influence corporate governance 
mechanisms assure investors in the corporation that they will receive adequate returns on their 
investments and if these mechanisms do not exist or do not function very well, outside investors would 
not lend to firms or buy equity securities in such firms (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  Williams (2000) 
argued that national corporate governance traditions are distinctive, deeply rooted, and difficult to 
change and that a country’s legal traditions and its stage of economic development are important 
determinants of corporate governance institutions. Common law tends to provide more explicit 
investors’ protections than civil laws in a country while, richer countries tend to enforce corporate 
governance laws stricter than poor countries. Broader and deeper financial markets emerge in the 
presence of strong investors’ protections, fostering more outside financing and better corporate 
financial performance. Corporate governance system also influences resident firm’s capital structures 
and ownership structures (Lasfer, 2002). 
  Finally, a broader perspective on corporate performance suggests that no country’s system of 
corporate governance is without shortcomings. They however proposed with evidence that better 
investors’ protections and a stronger rule of law are related both to better corporate performance of 
firms that require  external finance and to several measures of aggregate economic out performance. 
 
Methodology 
The data for this study were collected through the administration of a 5-point Likert scale 
questionnaire. The copies were administered with the assistance of two (2) well informed research 
assistants. The administration was done during the break time from 12 noon to 1.30 p.m each day 
when most of the respondents were on break and had time to attend to the researchers. 
 
Population of the study 
The area of study for the purpose of this study is the Nigeria Banking sector. The population 
of this study consisted of all the Nigerian banks that were able to scale through twenty five billions 
capital base requirement by the Central Bank of Nigeria. The five selected banks were (i.e Oceanic 
Bank Plc, Union Bank of Nigeria, Inter Continental Bank Plc,  Afri Bank Plc and Bank PHB) based on 
the recent restructuring in the management of those banks by the current Governor  (Mr. Sanusi) of the 
Central Bank of Nigeria . 
 
Instrument  
The questionnaire developed by the researchers was the instrument used to collect data for the 
study. The questionnaire which consisted of 12 items was designed to elicit opinions of respondents 
from those selected banks (Oceanic Bank Plc, Union Bank of Nigeria, Inter Continental Bank Plc, 
Bank PHB and Afri Bank Plc) on the effect of corporate governance on the performance of banking 
sector in Nigeria. The Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 15 of 2008 was used for 
data analysis. The reliability of the instrument was determined by split-half (internal consistency) 
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Table 1: Data Presentation and Analysis 










1 The mode of corporate governance has helped your bank to 
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4 My company prepared a mission statement after the 


























Shareholders have been satisfactorily responding to the 
























8 The company’s financial statement has to be qualified by the 











9 My company’s assets have grown over the years due to  









10 The corporate governance of my company has positively 











11 Effective corporate governance is affected by the 























Source: Field Work ,2010. 
 
Table 2: Calculation of Correlation (test of Hypothesis 1) 
Options Point (X) Response (Y) XY X2 Y2 
SA 5 60 300 25 3,600 
A 4 16 64 16 256 
U 3 14 42 9 196 
D 2 12 24 4 144 
SD 1 18 18 1 324 
∑ 15 120 448 55 4520 
 
Source; Question 7 from Field Work, 2010 
 
r =                         n∑ XY - ∑X ∑Y 
                     √ [(n∑X2 – ( ∑X)2][n ∑Y2 – ( ∑Y)2] 
=        
                        5 (445) – (15 ×120) 
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                            2,225 – 1,800 
                 √(275-225) (22,600 -14,400) 
                                 
                                   425         =   0.66 
    =                            640 
      
  
Decision 
Since r cal of 0.66 is greater than 0.5 level of significance,  which suggests that there is a 
strong and direct relationship between the variables. The null hypothesis is therefore rejected and the 
alternative hypothesis that says “There is a significance relationship between auditor’s independence 
and the effective corporate governance’ is accepted. 
                
         Table 3: Calculation of Correlation (test of hypothesis 2) 
Options Point (X) Response (Y) XY X2 Y2 
SA 5 61 305 25 3721 
A 4 29 116 16 841 
U 3 3 9 9 9 
D 2 17 34 4 289 
SD 1 10 10 1 100 
∑ 15 120 474 55 4960 
Source; Question 11 from Field Work, 2010 
 
r =                             n∑ XY - ∑X ∑Y  
                     √ [(n∑X2 – ( ∑X)2 ][n ∑Y2 – ( ∑Y)2] 
           
                              5 (474) – (15 ×120) 
             √ [(5×55) – (15)2][(5×4960)- (120)2 
                        
                             2,370 – 1,800 
                 √ (275-225) (24,800 -14,400)  
                                   
                                 570      =   0.79 
                                  721 
   
Decision 
Since r cal of 0.79 is greater than 0.5 level of significance, it suggests that there is a strong and 
direct relationship between the variables. The null hypothesis is therefore rejected and the alternative 
hypothesis that says “There is   a significance relationship between the effective corporate governance 
and the composition of the board of directors’ is accepted. 
                                                                   
Findings  
The following findings were carefully made; 
a) Based on the deductive analysis from the questionnaire, it was discovered that most of the 
workers are not so conversant with the contents or issues and concerns considered by 
corporate governance codes. 
b) Many do no know the number of shares held by the executive directors in the company 
c) Through the questionnaire administered, it was discovered that there is a relationship between 
the corporate governance and the organizational performance. 
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d) Good corporate governance well put in place in the Nigerian banking sector and positively 
influence the sectors performance will subsequently result in the economic growth and 
development. 
e) There is a need for every worker in the organization to know how the organization is fairing in 
terms of performance, whether they are improving or not. One of the ways to determine this is 
through increase or decrease in the company’s shareholding in the hand of shareholders. It was 
discovered that many of the members of staff were not really conversant with their 
organizational performance in terms of the level of the shareholdings in the company after the 
publication of the previous year’s financial statement.  
 
Conclusion  
The role corporate governance plays in the performance (financial and non-financial) of a 
public limited liability company is imperative and highly significant. This is because the concept deals 
with the processes, policies, rules, regulations, customs, laws and institutions affecting the way in 
which a corporation is directed, controlled through the influence of the board of directors and top 
executive members of the enterprise. Hence, for corporate governance to have a positive significant 
effect on organizational performance, honesty transparency and objectivity are highly required; due to 
the fact that the effectiveness and efficiency of the company in terms of generating increased profits, 
returns on capital employed, goodwill and shareholding anchor on the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the organization’s corporate governance. 
The review of literature on the concept of corporate governance and performance of Limited 
Liability Company in Nigeria showed that many banks in Nigeria lack transparency on the part of the 
stewards (Board of Directors) who always fail to disclose detailed information on the state of affairs 
and financial health of the organization probably due to the fear of appointment of new Board 
members or the need to look more efficient in the eyes of the shareholders and be applauded make 
them to usually window dress the financial statement and thereby living out vital information that will 
serve as signal to the financial sickness of the organization.    This singular act has led to the demise of 
so many giant corporations which should have been re- engineered and restructured for better 
performance simply because the management does not give corporate governance the priority it 
deserves. Weakness of the internal control system and management overrinding control often renders 
corporate governance ineffective. The management of these banks should know that a lot of benefits 
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